From Active Directory to Entra ID: hybrid attack paths through Entra Connect
Key takeaways
- Synchronising with Entra Connect links two security domains. A compromised on-premises Active Directory can quickly become a compromised Microsoft 365 tenant.
- Microsoft classifies the Entra Connect server as Tier 0, the same protection level as domain controllers. The same applies to servers running pass-through authentication agents and to AD FS.
- Administrators in Entra ID should use cloud-only accounts. No synchronised on-premises account should hold a privileged role in Microsoft 365.
- The sign-in method shapes the risk: with federation, a stolen token-signing certificate is enough to impersonate any user. Microsoft recommends cloud authentication, usually with password hash synchronisation.
Most mid-sized organisations run a hybrid setup: users and groups are created in on-premises Active Directory, and Microsoft Entra Connect or Entra Cloud Sync replicates them to Entra ID. That is convenient and the right choice for many environments. From an attacker’s point of view, though, it is a bridge. In an internal penetration test, the assessment therefore does not stop at the domain controller. It continues with the question of whether the path into the cloud is open. This article describes the typical hybrid attack paths and the countermeasures Microsoft currently recommends.
Why is the synchronisation server Tier 0?
The Active Directory tier model groups systems by their power over identities. Tier 0 is everything that directly or indirectly controls Active Directory. Microsoft explicitly includes Microsoft Entra Connect, AD FS and Active Directory Certificate Services.
The reason lies in the permissions. For password hash synchronisation, the Entra Connect connector account needs “Replicating Directory Changes” and “Replicating Directory Changes All” on the domain. With these it can read password hashes from Active Directory, just like a domain controller does during replication. At the same time, the server has an identity it uses to write objects to Entra ID. Whoever controls the server sits at both ends of the bridge.
In practice this means: only Tier 0 administrators sign in to the Entra Connect server, and only from a hardened admin workstation. No backup operator, no Hyper-V administrator and no IT service provider with a general maintenance account. The server is not a multi-purpose server and runs no other applications. Monitoring, backup and EDR agents running on it also belong to Tier 0 from an organisational perspective.
How does an attacker get from AD into the cloud?
From a tester’s perspective, there are four typical paths. Most of them assume that domain admin rights or control of one of the servers involved has already been achieved.
Synchronised privileged accounts
The most direct route: an administrator uses the same synchronised account for on-premises AD and for the Global Administrator role in Entra ID. Whoever resets that account’s password in AD can sign in to the cloud with the new password, unless strong MFA stands in the way. The same applies to synchronised groups used to grant roles or access in the cloud: change the group in AD and you change the cloud permissions.
Microsoft’s recommendation is therefore clear: administrator accounts for Microsoft 365 and Entra ID are cloud-only, no on-premises account has elevated privileges in Microsoft 365, and roles are not assigned through synchronised groups.
Since 1 July 2026, Microsoft has also enforced a service-side protection: a so-called hard match, where an on-premises object takes over an existing cloud account, is blocked if the cloud account holds or is eligible for a privileged role. You should also block soft matching on email address or UPN with the BlockSoftMatchEnabled setting as long as you do not need it for a migration.
Control of the Entra Connect server
Whoever controls the server can read password hashes from AD and write changes to Entra ID. The countermeasure is the Tier 0 treatment described above, plus a current version. Microsoft has moved Entra Connect Sync to application-based authentication: instead of a synchronisation account with a username and password, the server authenticates with an application identity and a certificate. New installations use this automatically. Since version 2.6.84.0, released in July 2026, existing servers are no longer switched over automatically. You need to start this yourself in the wizard under Configure application-based authentication to Microsoft Entra ID and then remove the old Directory Synchronization Account. This cannot be postponed indefinitely: according to Microsoft, servers must run at least version 2.6.84.0 and use application-based authentication by 7 April 2027, otherwise synchronisation stops. Microsoft also points out a side effect: the Application Administrator role can add credentials to this application. Assigning that role therefore indirectly grants influence over synchronisation.
Seamless SSO and the AZUREADSSOACC account
Seamless single sign-on signs users on domain-joined machines in to Microsoft 365 automatically. For this, Entra Connect creates a computer account called AZUREADSSOACC in AD and shares its Kerberos key with Entra ID. Microsoft is unambiguous: if this key leaks, Kerberos tickets can be generated for any synchronised user.
Microsoft’s countermeasures: roll over the key at least every 30 days, keep the account in an organisational unit that only domain admins can access, allow no Kerberos delegation, and use AES rather than RC4. With the July 2026 Windows security update, Microsoft completed the enforcement against RC4 for Kerberos service tickets and explicitly advises moving AZUREADSSOACC to AES-256, after rolling over the key first. Even better: turn Seamless SSO off when it is no longer needed. It dates from the Windows 7 and 8.1 era. Windows 10 and Windows 11 devices that are hybrid-joined or Entra-joined sign in with the Primary Refresh Token and do not need it.
Federation with AD FS
With federation, the on-premises AD FS issues the sign-in and signs it with a certificate. Microsoft describes the risk like this: whoever holds the token-signing certificate can impersonate any user in the cloud. The recommendation is to turn off federation for Microsoft 365 sign-in where possible and to move other applications to Entra ID as well.
Which sign-in method is the most secure?
| Method | Where is the password checked? | Main risk | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Password hash synchronisation (PHS) | In Entra ID, against a derived hash | Entra Connect server with replication rights | Recommended, enables leaked credential detection |
| Pass-through authentication (PTA) | In on-premises AD, via agents | Agent servers, dependency on on-premises availability | Acceptable, protect agent servers like domain controllers |
| Federation (AD FS) | On premises, AD FS issues tokens | Token-signing certificate allows sign-in as any user | Replace where possible |
Our recommendation is PHS. The common concern that it puts “passwords in the cloud” misses the point: what is transferred is a derived hash, and the bigger risk is the server with replication rights, which exists in every variant. PHS also lets Microsoft Entra ID Protection detect leaked credentials, and Microsoft 365 sign-ins keep working if on-premises AD fails, for example after a ransomware attack. For PTA, Microsoft recommends hardening the agent servers like domain controllers.
What should be monitored?
- Entra Connect Health for the state of synchronisation and agents.
- Microsoft Defender for Identity with sensors on the Entra Connect, AD FS and AD CS servers as well. Only then do the hybrid security assessments appear, for example a warning when the
AZUREADSSOACCpassword is older than 90 days. - Entra audit logs for changes to domain authentication and federation. Microsoft recommends an alert rule on this query:
AuditLogs
| where ActivityDisplayName contains "Set federation settings on domain"
or ActivityDisplayName contains "Set domain authentication"
| extend Target = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| project TimeGenerated, ActivityDisplayName, Target, InitiatedBy, Result
- Security logs of the hybrid servers themselves, archived and reviewed like those of the domain controllers.
What does this mean for management and IT service providers?
Hybrid identity has often grown over time and sits with an external IT service provider. Three specific questions to IT are worth asking at management level: Are our cloud administrators cloud-only accounts with phishing-resistant sign-in? Who can sign in to the Entra Connect server, and from which device? Do we still use federation or Seamless SSO, and if so, why? The answers quickly show whether the bridge between AD and the cloud is guarded.
For regulated organisations, this is also a matter of evidence. NIS2 and DORA require management of privileged access. A domain admin who is also a Global Administrator is hard to justify as appropriate in an audit.
Next step
Our Active Directory assessment reviews on-premises AD and the hybrid connection together, including Entra Connect, Seamless SSO and federation. We secure the cloud side with cloud-only admins, PIM and Conditional Access as part of Microsoft 365 hardening.
Frequently asked questions
Is Microsoft Entra Cloud Sync more secure than Entra Connect Sync?
Cloud Sync moves the synchronisation logic into the cloud and uses lightweight agents. Microsoft describes Cloud Sync as the future of synchronisation. The basic rule does not change: servers running synchronisation agents are identity systems and need Tier 0 protection.
Do I have to turn off Seamless SSO?
If all Windows devices run Windows 10 or 11 and are hybrid-joined or Entra-joined, Seamless SSO is usually no longer needed, and Microsoft recommends turning it off. If you keep using it, roll over the Kerberos key at least every 30 days.
May an IT service provider be both domain admin and Global Administrator?
Technically yes, but from a security point of view these should be separate accounts: an on-premises Tier 0 account for AD and a cloud-only account with PIM and phishing-resistant sign-in for Entra ID. Both should only be used from hardened admin workstations.
What happens to Microsoft 365 if our on-premises AD is encrypted?
With password hash synchronisation, users can still sign in to Microsoft 365. With pass-through authentication or federation, sign-in depends on the on-premises infrastructure. That is another reason to use PHS as the default.
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