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Back to overview Illustration: an email with an invoice and altered bank details, a callback and four-eyes approval protect the payment
Email security Defender for Office 365 Fraud prevention

Preventing invoice fraud by email: Microsoft 365 settings and payment processes

By , Security & Cloud Operations 8 min read

Key takeaways

  • Invoice fraud by email (business email compromise, BEC) usually needs no malware. It relies on spoofed senders, lookalike domains or genuine supplier mailboxes that have been taken over.
  • The most effective technical controls are impersonation protection in Defender for Office 365, tagging of external senders, blocking automatic forwarding to external addresses, DMARC and phishing-resistant MFA.
  • No filter catches a compromised supplier mailbox. Only the process protects you here: a call-back to a known number for every change of bank details, and the four-eyes principle.
  • Once money has been transferred, every hour counts: call your bank immediately, report it to the police, preserve evidence and investigate the mailbox.

An email from a long-standing supplier: they have changed banks, please pay the outstanding invoice to the new account. Sender, signature and tone all look right, and accounts payable makes the payment. Weeks later the supplier asks where their money is. This scheme deliberately targets finance and accounts teams, and it hits organisations of every size. For management it is particularly uncomfortable, because the loss does not come from a security vulnerability in the classic sense but from a process that fails to spot a forged instruction. This article covers which Microsoft 365 settings reduce the attack surface and which payment rules catch the rest.

How does invoice fraud by email work?

Three patterns are common:

  • CEO fraud. A supposed instruction from senior management demands an urgent, confidential payment, often referring to an acquisition or a secret project. The sender address is spoofed, or it is a free webmail address using the managing director’s name.
  • Changed bank details via a lookalike domain. The attackers register a domain resembling the supplier’s, for example with swapped letters, and continue an existing email thread.
  • Compromised mailbox. A supplier’s mailbox, or one of your own, has been taken over through phishing. The attackers read along, create forwarding and inbox rules so that queries go unnoticed, and send the payment request from the genuine mailbox.

The German police guidance on CEO fraud recommends, above all, verifying unusual payment requests by calling back the supposed requester, involving management, training finance and accounts staff, and reviewing what company information is publicly available.

Which Microsoft 365 settings protect you?

Impersonation protection in Defender for Office 365

Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Plan 1 is included in Microsoft 365 Business Premium and, since 1 July 2026, in Microsoft 365 E3 and Office 365 E3. Its anti-phishing policies then include impersonation protection, which the baseline protection in Exchange Online does not offer:

  • User impersonation protection: Up to 350 internal or external senders per policy, such as managing directors, the head of finance and key suppliers, are checked for name variations.
  • Domain impersonation protection: Detects domains that resemble your own or up to 50 named partner domains.
  • Mailbox intelligence: Learns each mailbox’s usual correspondents. Combined with “Enable intelligence for impersonation protection”, it can act on suspicious messages.

By default, all three detections are set to “Don’t apply any action”. Without deliberate configuration, Defender detects but does nothing. Set the action to quarantine, or use the Standard or Strict preset security policies, where the actions are already set; you still need to add the senders to be protected yourself. Our article on Defender for Office 365 covers the details.

To set expectations: impersonation protection only applies when sender and recipient have not previously exchanged email. It does not detect a genuine supplier mailbox that has been taken over. That is exactly why the process further down is needed.

Tag external senders

The command Set-ExternalInOutlook -Enabled $true in Exchange Online PowerShell makes Outlook show an “External” tag on messages from outside the organisation, in Outlook for Windows, Mac, the web and mobile. A supposed managing director writing with an “External” tag stands out. Disable any existing mail flow rules that add “[EXTERNAL]” to the subject first, or the tag appears twice. In addition, the anti-phishing policies let you switch on a safety tip for the first contact with a new sender for all mailboxes.

Block automatic forwarding to external addresses

Attackers who have taken over a mailbox like to set up forwarding to an external address. In the outbound anti-spam policies, Automatic forwarding rules defaults to “Automatic - System-controlled”, and what that means can vary between tenants. Microsoft therefore recommends setting “Off - Forwarding is disabled” explicitly. Handle exceptions for individual mailboxes with a separate policy or remote domains. Review the “Auto forwarded messages” report in the Exchange admin center once a month.

DMARC for your own domain

SPF, DKIM and DMARC prevent others from sending email with your exact sender domain, for example fake invoices to your customers. The goal is a DMARC policy of “reject”. Our article on SPF, DKIM and DMARC in Microsoft 365 explains the setup. DMARC does not help against lookalike domains; that is what impersonation protection is for.

MFA, ideally phishing-resistant

Most mailbox takeovers start with stolen credentials. MFA for every account is mandatory. For finance, management and administrators, moving to phishing-resistant methods such as passkeys or FIDO2 security keys is worthwhile, because these also protect against phishing pages that relay a normal MFA prompt in real time.

Which payment processes do you need?

Technology reduces the number of forged emails that arrive. It does not bring it to zero. Three rules catch the rest:

  1. Call back on every change of bank details. Accounts payable calls the supplier on a number already held in the master data, never on the number in the email. The confirmation is recorded in the master data with date and contact name.
  2. Four-eyes principle for new payees, changed bank details and payments above a defined amount. Online banking can usually enforce this through separate approval rights.
  3. No exceptions under pressure. Urgency and confidentiality are typical features of CEO fraud. A written rule that management never instructs payments by email outside the process protects staff who would otherwise come under pressure.

Add clear absence arrangements: who covers payment approval during holidays? Attackers deliberately target periods when the responsible people cannot be reached.

What should you do once money has been transferred?

  1. Call your own bank immediately and ask for the transfer to be recalled. As long as the money has not been credited to the recipient account, there is a chance. After that, the chances drop quickly, and with an instant payment the money is usually credited within seconds.
  2. Report it to the police, at the local station or online. In Germany, the cybercrime contact points of the state criminal police offices (Landeskriminalamt) are also responsible for companies.
  3. Preserve evidence: original emails with full headers, the transfer record, notes of phone calls. Do not delete anything.
  4. Investigate mailboxes: if one of your own mailboxes is affected, reset the password immediately, revoke sessions, check inbox and forwarding rules and review the sign-in logs in Entra ID. If the supplier’s mailbox is affected, inform them through a known channel.
  5. Notify your insurer if you have cyber or crime (fidelity) insurance. Many policies require prompt notification.
  6. Check reporting obligations, for example under NIS2 or data protection law if a mailbox containing personal data was compromised.

If you suspect a mailbox has been taken over, we can support the investigation; the first steps are on our suspected cyberattack page.

Next step

The settings described here are part of our Microsoft 365 hardening: anti-phishing policies with impersonation protection, external sender tagging, blocked forwarding, DMARC and Conditional Access with phishing-resistant MFA for the finance team. We agree the payment process with management and accounts, because it cannot be enforced through configuration.

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Frequently asked questions

Is the baseline protection in Exchange Online enough against invoice fraud?

No. Baseline protection detects spoofed senders using SPF, DKIM and DMARC, but not impersonation through similar names or domains. That requires Defender for Office 365, which is already included in Microsoft 365 Business Premium and E3.

Who should be on the list of protected senders?

Managing directors, authorised signatories, the heads of finance and accounts, and the external contacts at your most important suppliers and banks. A policy cannot hold more than 350 entries, and the list should be reviewed every year.

Does blocking forwarding get in the way of legitimate work?

Rarely. Anyone who genuinely needs forwarding to an external system, such as a service provider’s ticketing system, gets a separate policy or a remote domain exception. What matters is that such exceptions are documented and known.

Is the bank liable if we paid into the wrong account?

That depends on the individual case and the contract terms, and is a legal question to clarify with your bank and, if necessary, legal counsel. Either way, the sooner the bank is informed, the better the chances of a recall.

Let's talk about your IT security

In the introductory call (30 minutes, no obligation) we clarify:

  • where your company stands today and what concerns you most
  • which next step makes sense for your organisation
  • what effort and price range to expect
Bastian Wenske

Bastian Wenske

Founder & Managing Director

Heidelberger Straße 15
12059 Berlin
Germany

Prefer to reach out directly? Send us an email at [email protected].