Removing local admin rights: Windows LAPS and Endpoint Privilege Management with Intune
Key takeaways
- Anyone with permanent local admin rights can switch off protection and run malware with full privileges. Removing those rights is one of the most effective single measures on the endpoint.
- Windows LAPS rotates the password of the local administrator account and backs it up to Microsoft Entra ID. Intune Plan 1 and Microsoft Entra ID Free are enough.
- Endpoint Privilege Management (EPM) lets standard users run approved programs elevated. Since July 2026 it is gradually being included in Microsoft 365 E5; for other plans it is an add-on.
- The sequence is measure, build rules, remove: run EPM in audit mode first, create rules from the reports, then lock down the local Administrators group by policy.
In many mid-sized companies, employees still work with local administrator rights, either because a business application demands it or because it was carried over when the device was set up. That is convenient for attackers: a click on a malicious attachment runs with full rights, and protection features can be disabled. For management it is also a question of evidence, as auditors, insurers and customers now ask specifically about privileged accounts. This article shows how to remove local admin rights with Windows LAPS and Endpoint Privilege Management without blocking everyday work.
Why are local admin rights a risk?
A local administrator can do anything on the device: install software, add Defender exclusions, load drivers, read credentials from memory. Two patterns come up again and again in our assessments. First, employees work day to day with an account that is a member of the local Administrators group. Second, many devices share the same local administrator password, set once in the image. In the second case, a single extracted password is enough to sign in to other devices. Microsoft explicitly names pass-the-hash and lateral movement as attacks that Windows LAPS protects against.
Devices set up with Microsoft Entra join have an additional quirk: by default, the person who joins the device becomes a member of the local Administrators group. You can switch this off in the Entra ID device settings (“Registering user is added as local administrator on the device during Microsoft Entra join”) or prevent it in the Autopilot profile by setting the user account type to Standard.
How do you set up Windows LAPS with Microsoft Entra ID?
Windows LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution) is built into Windows and replaces legacy LAPS. It sets a random password for one local administrator account per device, rotates it regularly and backs it up to Microsoft Entra ID or on-premises Active Directory, not both. Microsoft only requires Intune Plan 1 and Microsoft Entra ID Free.
- In the Microsoft Entra admin center, under Entra ID > Devices > Overview > Device settings, set Enable Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) to Yes. Without this setting, Entra ID does not accept LAPS passwords from devices.
- In the Intune admin center, under Endpoint security > Account protection, create a policy with the Local admin password solution (Windows LAPS) profile and set Backup Directory to Microsoft Entra ID.
- Assign the policy to device groups, not user groups. Microsoft points out that user-based assignment leads to inconsistent behaviour when users change.
The key settings and their defaults according to Microsoft:
| Setting | Default | Our recommendation |
|---|---|---|
| PasswordAgeDays | 30 days (minimum 7 with Entra ID) | 30 days or shorter |
| PasswordLength | 14 characters | 20 characters or more |
| PostAuthenticationResetDelay | 24 hours | shorter, e.g. 8 hours |
| PostAuthenticationActions | Reset password and sign out | keep |
The post-authentication action ensures that a password, once retrieved and used, is automatically invalidated after the configured delay. From Windows 11 24H2, LAPS can create, rename and disable the managed account itself through automatic account management. On older versions you must create a custom account beforehand or let LAPS manage the built-in Administrator account.
By default, besides Global Administrator, the Entra roles Cloud Device Administrator and Intune Administrator can read the password. Protect these roles with Conditional Access and phishing-resistant MFA, because whoever holds them effectively has admin access to every device. Note also that if a device is deleted in Entra ID, the password backed up there is lost.
What does Endpoint Privilege Management do, and what does it cost?
LAPS solves the shared admin password problem but not the fact that employees occasionally need to run something with admin rights. That is what Endpoint Privilege Management is for. Employees work as standard users and can launch approved programs elevated through the Run with elevated access context menu. EPM supports Windows; devices must be Entra-joined or hybrid-joined and managed by Intune or through co-management.
On licensing: since July 2026, Microsoft has been gradually distributing former Intune Suite capabilities across the Microsoft 365 plans. Microsoft 365 E5 then includes Endpoint Privilege Management among others; tenants are switched automatically and notified 30 days in advance in the Microsoft 365 admin center. With Microsoft 365 Business Premium or E3, you need EPM as a standalone add-on or as part of the Intune Suite. Microsoft offers a 90-day trial for up to 250 users.
EPM has five elevation types:
| Type | Behaviour | Use |
|---|---|---|
| Automatic | elevates without prompting | only for narrowly defined, signed programs in protected paths |
| User confirmed | user confirms, optionally with justification or Windows sign-in | default for known tools |
| Elevate as current user | runs in the user’s context instead of a virtual account | only if an app does not work otherwise |
| Support approved | request, approved by IT | one-off cases and unknown files |
| Deny | elevation is blocked | known risky programs |
We adopt two Microsoft recommendations without compromise. First, set the default response for files without a rule to Require support approval or Deny, not Require user confirmation, because otherwise any file can be elevated. Second, specify a file path in every rule that standard users cannot modify. Be careful with rules based on a publisher certificate: they allow every program signed with that certificate.
How do you approach the rollout?
Microsoft describes the transition from administrator to standard user in phases. In practice it looks like this:
- Measure. An elevation settings policy with EPM enabled, no default response, Send elevation data for reporting on and the reporting scope “Diagnostic data and all endpoint elevations”. This also shows elevations that still run through “Run as administrator” today. Reports populate after about 24 hours; an observation period of several weeks is sensible.
- Build rules. Rules can be created directly from the Elevation report. Group them by persona, for example administration, engineering, development.
- Pilot. One department becomes standard users; support-approved requests catch the gaps.
- Remove rights. Under Endpoint security > Account protection, use the Local user group membership profile to lock the local Administrators group to defined members with the Add (Replace) action. All members not listed are removed.
- Maintain. Review reports regularly, turn unmanaged elevations into rules or deny them, and update rules when versions or certificates change.
The EPM dashboard shows, among other things, which users only elevate through EPM. They are the first candidates for losing admin rights.
What about developers and engineers?
Development, engineering and IT operations are the groups that object most loudly, and often with good reason. Package managers, compilers, debuggers or programming software for industrial controllers regularly need elevated rights. Three approaches have worked. First, dedicated EPM rules for this persona, with path and arguments as narrow as possible, and strict rules for script hosts such as PowerShell, for which Microsoft recommends script-specific rules. Second, a separate working environment such as a virtual development machine, where broader rights are acceptable because it has no access to production data. Third, time-limited, documented exceptions with an expiry date instead of permanent membership of the Administrators group.
Administrators follow a different logic: anyone managing servers or the tenant should do so from a dedicated, hardened device. Our article on the privileged access workstation describes the concept.
How do you evidence the measure in an audit?
- LAPS retrievals: In the Entra admin center, under Entra ID > Devices > Overview > Audit logs, filter for the activities “Recover device local administrator password” and “Update device local administrator password”. If you collect logs in Log Analytics or Microsoft Sentinel, you can evaluate them long term:
AuditLogs
| where OperationName == "Recover device local administrator password"
| project TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, TargetResources
| order by TimeGenerated desc
- EPM reports: The elevation report, managed elevations report and the views by application, publisher and user show who elevated what and when, with justification if required.
- Role memberships: The Global Administrator and Microsoft Entra Joined Device Local Administrator roles automatically receive local admin rights on all Entra-joined devices. Microsoft recommends monitoring additions to these roles.
- Policy status: The assignment status of the local group membership policy shows on which devices the Administrators group is locked down.
Next step
Local admin rights are part of our endpoint security services. We set up LAPS and EPM, build the rules from your measurement data and hand over operations to your team or continue running them. If you first want to know how many accounts have local admin rights today, our Security Assessment checks this at a fixed price.
Frequently asked questions
Do I need an additional licence for Windows LAPS?
No. According to Microsoft, Intune Plan 1 and Microsoft Entra ID Free are sufficient. Without Intune, Windows LAPS can also be configured on Entra-joined devices through local policy, but Microsoft recommends Intune.
Can we use LAPS without Endpoint Privilege Management?
Yes, and it is a sensible first step. LAPS eliminates shared passwords. Without EPM, however, you still need someone from IT to retrieve the LAPS password and enter it on the device for elevated tasks.
What happens if a user wants to elevate a program that has no rule?
The default response from the elevation settings policy applies. With Require support approval, the user submits a request that IT approves or rejects in the Intune admin center. New rules can be created directly from approved requests.
Does EPM work on macOS?
According to Microsoft, EPM policies apply to Windows devices only.
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